

Leader Development and Education: Growing Leaders Now for the Future

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Today, the Army must meet the challenge of a wider range of threats and a more complex set of operating environments while incorporating new and diverse technology.

—Field Manual 7-0, *Training the Force*.¹

GENERAL Creighton Abrams, Jr., said, “People are not in the Army; they *are* the Army.”² Abrams’ words are a mantra for current and future efforts of the Army’s Leader Development (LD) Program. The Army and its people are facing the most difficult of challenges: the enemy drew first blood. The Army responded in magnificent fashion, defeating the terrorist cowards on every front, but senior leaders view these attacks on the Nation as the first glimpse of the future. Up to this point, the methods we have used to develop and educate the force have produced high-quality leaders who have proven their grit on multiple fronts. But is this enough? Is it timely? Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter J. Schoomaker has asked, “Can we sustain our high performance with our current methods of preparation?”³

The U.S. military conducts operations on a global scale. The diversity of our missions, the speed of their execution, and the effect of the information/technology age on today’s Global War on Terrorism compels an Army inquiry into the LD process. Professional scrutiny will answer the questions of sufficiency and timing.

Bolstered by senior-leader mentorship and guidance, the Leader Development and Education (LD&E) Task Force (TF) developed flexible, adaptable, innovative solutions to emerging problems. The LD&E TF was formed as part of the original 15 (now 17) Army focus areas, and its purpose—growing leaders—was made clear from the beginning.

Members were needed to conduct a review, devise a plan, and develop a mission. The process of

selecting who would participate was straightforward. After Combined Arms Center and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) senior leaders approved a list of stakeholders on the basis of their command, expertise, and academic backgrounds, the task force began operations. The task force had an enormous undertaking.

Growing quality leaders is the foundation for achieving and maintaining the land combat competencies the country requires. Equally important in growing adaptive, self-aware leaders is the Army’s continuing Transformation while fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Without an orchestrated campaign that integrates Transformation, we could compromise the growing-leaders core competency.

In 2003, Schoomaker said: “Leadership and courage are easily recognized as prerequisites at the tactical level, but they are essential at the operational and strategic levels as well. Are we developing the George C. Marshals for the new era?”⁴ Can the current developmental process produce the Marshals of the new millennia? Is the Army’s LD system meeting the needs of a future force while integrating aspects of the current environment relevant to today’s mission success?

Frontline documentation substantiates that the Army is producing exceptional leaders. If the current system is meeting our needs, producing quality leaders today, then what is wrong with the way the Army develops and educates its people? The answer is, nothing. Results on battlefields around the globe prove Army leaders can handle diverse and complex environments. What does strike the professional observer, however, is the speed with which these environments change and the diversity of tasks the force is expected to execute.

Our soldiers race across deserts in armored vehicles; fight in urban settings; fly over extreme mountainous terrain; hunt down and kill the enemy;

and the very next day provide humanitarian aid to civilians; administer medical clinics; restore power to cities; build schools and hospitals; and establish local governments. The Army is keeping the peace in the Balkans and in the Sinai. We are on station in the drug war, and we protect our homeland. Today's Army leaders are excellent, and the current LD model contributes to that success. But what about the Marshals of the new era?

The current operating environment has remained fairly stable over the past 4 years.⁵ What has changed is the speed with which the enemy is able to learn and apply his learning to operations. Terrorist organizations have altered the strategic and tactical situations. Even though state-sponsored terrorism is alive and well, nongovernment-affiliated terrorists and criminals are increasing in numbers and activities.

What the advocates of darkness have in common is the speed with which they adapt and change their methods—in some cases, as fast as we can adapt. This reinforces the importance of our obligation to examine all LD and education initiatives to ensure we keep pace with the changing environment and to produce competent professionals. To maintain a qualitative edge in the future—to develop more Marshals—we must figure out the contextual environment and apply sage mentorship to define further steps to accomplish the task.

The Context and the Mission

The task force determined the essential components of the contextual environment by researching the contemporary operating environment (COE) and canvassing lessons learned, threat analysis, and professional experiences. The task force concluded that we are an Army at war achieving operational success on many fronts, but that our forces can do better in retaining our advantage over an adaptive enemy.

The task force acknowledged the current LD system has been successful, especially at the tactical level but concluded the system is at risk because of resource decisions. Manpower and funding allocations for TRADOC for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 are examples of inadequate resourcing. TRADOC is responsible for developing and executing leader development and education, and underresourcing these vital processes puts their effectiveness at risk.⁶

The Army is not implementing change rapidly enough. Change management is key to maintaining the competitive edge with the enemy. If our leaders do not seize on lessons learned and do not have the

intellectual tools that buttress creative thinking and critical reasoning, we only maintain parity with a learning enemy. This is the context in which we develop and educate our leaders.

The task force asked experts in the field of leader development in academia, business, the civil service, and the research community for their views on today's leaders. They said the Army must train and educate Army members of the joint team. This education and training is the keystone for joint land power. The Army is the preeminent land power, and the Nation expects it to conduct and sustain land combat as part of a joint team.

If training and education do not integrate current lessons learned and creative-thinking methodologies, our preeminence will atrophy. As joint teammates, we must have an expeditionary mindset. If we cannot get to the fight, our ability to influence outcomes will disappear. To instill the expeditionary mindset as a cultural norm, our professional educational systems must be a catalyst for change.

Our leaders must be able to deal with complexity on many fronts and on many levels. The Army's variety of missions calls for leaders with superior professional agility grounded in Army values. Army forces must exhibit deployment agility and speed; staying power in the sense of time and resources; and a versatility that succeeds across the full spectrum of operations.

Sustained land combat power is not about going and coming back; it is about going into uncertain circumstances rapidly, fighting for information, and engaging and developing the situation without all the information a commander would normally have or expect to have. The environment is one of ambiguity. We are fighting to turn it into certainty. Information that will arm leaders at all levels with the knowledge to command in battle will only increase. Decisionmaking will migrate in part to leaders not previously exposed to such wide-ranging tactical, operational, and strategic ramifications.

Direct, organizational, and strategic leaders will make decisions that routinely cross historical authority, and we will feel the effects of their decisions instantaneously throughout the area of operations. Training and educational systems must cope with these emerging requirements. Our LD process must provide opportunities to soldiers to build leader competencies that will carry the day. The lion's share of preparing current and future leaders falls to the institutional domain, which must train for certainty but educate for ambiguity. Educating for uncertainty mandates examining our learning philosophy.

The evolving guidance and counsel from assembled stakeholders was “experience.” As part of the LD system, our institutions must generate experience before soldiers need it. We must nest methods of delivery and timely educational content that generates experience in a revamped philosophy as well as a developing force structure. Educational delivery must go beyond bricks and mortar. LD systems must equip soldiers to meet complex, diverse mission demands today. The prospect of having time to learn from mistakes on the modern battlefield is gone. Soldiers must have experience embedded in them before they arrive in the area of operations.

One area that builds experiential learning models is the use of critical reasoning and creative thinking (CRCT). While preparing soldiers for immediate threats, we must educate the current force for the future. Our institutions must educate organizational leaders and above in CRCT to build a bridge from the present to the future. CRCT is an essential thinking process to master the enemy. We must reprioritize content-delivery methods that emphasize how to think. Being able to outthink an adaptive enemy with tremendous access to information is a weapon of great power. CRCT concentrates and capitalizes on the U.S. soldier’s ingenuity at changing ambiguity to certainty.

Guidance

Guidance provides direction for completion of mission analysis. As a result of contextual clarity and senior mentorship, the task force developed a restated mission, end state, and tasks.

Restated mission. The restated mission proposes a strategy and implementation plan to develop leaders with the right mix of unit experience, training, education, and self-development to meet current and future leadership requirements.

End state. The end state will be leaders who are innovative, self-aware, adaptive, and able to provide competent, confident leadership for an expeditionary Army with campaign qualities conducting joint, interagency, and multinational operations in the COE.

Tasks. Tasks we must perform include—

- Adjusting LD systems to support any army at war.
- Examining the education of Army leaders and making recommendations to improve it to meet current and future leadership requirements in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) operations.
- Maneuvering training and education to support officer, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer

leader development.

- Mirroring Active and Reserve Components LD programs.
- Incorporating lessons learned from all Army operations across the spectrum.
- Reviewing Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) reports, determining any reprioritization, and developing an implementation strategy.
- Incorporating jointness at all appropriate levels.
- Linking leader development to personnel stability initiatives.
- Networking senior service colleges better.

The task force’s mission analysis codified relevant aspects of leader development and programs supporting the LD process. Educational outcomes that set conditions for leaders to assume greater, more complex positions are inextricably linked to leader development. A vital component of that education is generating the experience that allows leaders to overcome ambiguity. CRCT is one format that generates experience before it is needed. Within the institutional domain, current and future leaders will develop experiences through education and training. These developmental sessions will provide professionals with the necessary judgment and knowledge to remain adaptive, innovative, and self-aware, which is one way to germinate the growth of leaders.

The LD&E TF examined Army educational systems, the COE, and the threat and explored the Army’s educational process, policy, technology, and resources. The thoroughness of the task force’s work gives us confidence in its recommendations and plans.

The Army provides an exceptional LD&E program today. Past and present leaders are testament to professional development’s quality and effectiveness. By incorporating the ideas the task force generated and validated, the outlook for future LD&E systems will be equally bright. Then it will not be a question of “if” we will produce the next Marshall, it will be just a question of when.

Task Force Recommendations

The Army’s LD system lacks a campaign plan to maintain its relevance and to incorporate the inevitable changes the military profession continues to experience. The LD process is one of “dynamic stability,” by which we mean our leaders have developed in such a manner they possess the necessary competencies to function successfully in the current

COE. Given recent glimpses of what the future might have in store, however, that same LD system must evolve to support a changing environment.

The LD&E TF white paper says: "To remain relevant, the Army's LD and education system must train, educate, and grow Army leaders who are the centerpiece of a campaign-quality Army and are imbued with a joint expeditionary mindset."⁷ Relevancy is key to continued operational superiority and is accomplished through the Army's LD process, which has three domains: operational, institutional, and self-development.

In the operational domain, leader development is consummated in units and organizations through individual and collective training at home station; during major training exercises; through combat training center program participation; and while conducting full-spectrum operations. Leader development is facilitated by individual commitment and organizational support to self-development, filling gaps in leader knowledge, skills, and abilities as identified through individual and organizational assessment and feedback systems.

The institutional domain provides standards-based training and education. Instruction and education for current and future leaders instills a warrior ethos and a common doctrinal foundation. These leaders will be self-aware, innovative, adaptive, and able to operate successfully as part of a joint team.

The third domain, self-development, is a standards-based, feedback-driven, structured program of activities and learning that contributes to professional competence, organizational effectiveness, and personal development. Individual and organizational assessment and feedback programs in the operational and institutional domains, linked to developmental actions, grow competent, confident leaders leading trained and ready organizations and units.

Developing innovative, adaptive joint leaders to meet the needs of the Army and the Nation requires agile, innovative LD&E systems. The following TF recommendations will support our profession's continued improvement:

- Commit to lifelong learning.
- Resource high-payoff ATLDP recommendations.



MG Craig Bambrugh, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command, addresses a battalion/brigade pre-command class at the Fort McCoy Army Reserve Readiness Training Center, Wisconsin.

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- Adjust LD&E content, delivery, and timing.
- Exploit learning technologies.
- Establish a single integrating proponent.
- Establish LD&E for civilian leaders.

Commit to lifelong learning. Establishing an Army culture that commits Army leaders to lifelong learning is an aspect of leader development not normally explored. The lifelong-learning process has standards, assessment, and feedback tools and self-development programmatics. For lifelong learning to be inculcated, it must occur in a supportive organizational climate that will underwrite legitimate, honest mistakes and provide incentives.

Lifelong learning is a way to build leaders for the future and develop leaders into critical thinkers who can think and learn faster and dominate adversaries in future operations. The Army is updating FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, to incorporate lifelong learning, self-development, service ethic, mentoring, and the warrior ethos.⁸ By revising the doctrinal base, the Army can develop, program, and execute actions to standardize and institutionalize leader development.

The Army will also synchronize and update leadership policy, Army training, and operational doctrine. After the doctrinal base has been established and the policy updated, the Army must integrate and synchronize operational doctrine and requirements to facilitate execution of the LD process. An example of this is the revision of U.S. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management*, where a revised timeline allows for more organizational domain experience and

an educational system to support it.⁹

The Army moves forward in reinforcing leadership doctrine in operational and strategic forms. An example is integrating doctrine into courses such as the Pre-Command Course and the Brigadier General Training Course. The Army must measure all aspects of leadership to facilitate quantifying effective leadership, and doctrine must be a part of all professional activities. In a doctrinally based Army, common standards are universally used as measures of leader effectiveness. At every educational and training opportunity, the Army must promulgate leadership doctrine in discussions, standards-based assessment, and modeling. All leaders should receive frequent reinforcement of leadership training and education.

Committing to lifelong learning will require us to take another look at the career model's length. The task force validated the notion the profession of arms is a complicated business. To master this complexity, soldiers need more time for professional development. The task force found a time constraint in accomplishing all LD tasks in a 20-year career model.¹⁰ The length of time a soldier has to accomplish these tasks has been a point of friction. The current career model is too restrictive and, ultimately, is a compromising experience. By modifying career gates, board expectations of timing, and increasing career length from 20 to 30 years, Army professionals can achieve the right balance between the three domains.

A key component in developing leaders is feedback. Feedback provides valuable information leaders at all levels need to make professional adjustments. Feedback provides the measures to gauge success. The task force recommended implementing a 360-degree assessment-and-feedback program in operational and institutional settings. At any level and any position, feedback is essential for growth. During analysis and research of previous studies, the task force discovered that the profession's feedback system is deficient.¹¹ Most leaders only receive formal feedback from superiors in the form of an evaluation, but many successful leaders use a feedback system that seeks input from all sources (subordinates, peers, and superiors) and is not necessarily linked to evaluations. We must formalize this philosophy throughout the Army.

Repositories of knowledge captured in past and present literary works are hallmarks of professional programs. The task force believes it is necessary to maintain and continue to update Schoomaker's professional reading list.¹² Access to knowledge and

the time to learn are important aspects of self-development. A comprehensive reading list, approved by the Army's senior mentor and coach, sets forth the behavior expected of today's professional, documents what is deemed important knowledge, and provides a means to attain that knowledge. Reading lists, when followed, are a cost-effective way to support professional growth.

Lifelong learning is not just about lists or policy or doctrine; it is about an attitude toward our profession. If we are committed to the profession of arms and to improving our ability to serve the Nation and enhance leadership growth, lifelong learning is the way we will live.

Resource high-payoff ATLDP recommendations. The Army must modify its doctrine and policy and resource programs that support this recommendation. Without the proper targeting of resources, high-value opportunities for service-specific and joint experiences will not be attainable.

The task force substantiated the ATLDP's Phase I-IV findings and recommended resourcing for implementation to recapitalize the existing LD&E system to maintain current capabilities and to modernize it for the future. The task force looked at the full spectrum of requirements and proposed certain actions for the near-term and the mid-term.

In the near-term, the Army's System Approach to Training (SAT) process needs overhauling. This conclusion is based on requirements generated from evolving JIIM and COE requirements and Army Transformation. The redesign must capitalize on technology that facilitates collaboration with the field while streamlining procedures to make major changes to training and education systems that effect delivery, content, and educational outcomes.

The Army must develop and maintain a series of common scenarios. Inefficient use of multiple scenarios without oversight and standardization increases the risk of having ill-prepared leaders. Applying resources to develop, package, distribute, and maintain a menu of common scenarios eliminates most standardization issues; allows more flexibility in individual assignments after training; and supports the concept of modularity or "plug and play" task organizations through standardized knowledge levels. In a practical sense, standardization will help preclude new starts to every course, enhance the ability to collaborate, increase efficiency in terrain databases, and integrate live, virtual, and constructive training environments.

We should also continue supporting the Army's Assessment and Feedback Program beyond pilot

execution. This vital program will harness leaders' expertise unobtrusively and provide the feedback for leader growth. Procedural disregard of the vast repository of information that resides in peers and subordinates has been a glaring deficiency in harnessing data for leader development. Current feedback systems are top-down, but successful commanders have tapped bottom-up and lateral information sources, and the research shows the Army would greatly benefit from a standardized 360-degree assessment-and-feedback process.

In the mid-term, we must redesign current Army training and education resourcing and support processes to bolster rapid (6- to 12-month) changes to training and education and make resourcing and training support systems more agile and responsive by revising or replacing the Army Training Requirements Reservation System and automated SAT. Timelines and decision points within the Structure Manning Decision Review and the Training Resources Arbitration Panel are two such areas that need revamping. Shortening the timelines without bypassing a required decisionmaker is possible.

Course development and implementation based on the SAT process requires revision as well. We must resource training and curriculum development manpower allocations and provide training and curriculum developers with the latest technologies. Converted authorizations and proper distribution of civilian hires or contractors are a possible solution. Proactive conversions of these positions and subsequently returning them to the operational force of soldier capital will reduce costs.

Developing and upgrading education and training delivery systems requires further evaluation. We must provide funding to initiate this important work and include operational requirements, reachback, and life-long-learning needs. A needs analysis is the first step to remedy actual or perceived deficiencies. The next steps are to design the remedy based on the requirements, develop it in multiple-delivery means, and train its implementation across each domain. Adequate funding will help synchronize the Battle Command Knowledge System with courseware conversions enabling reachback from the field. Resourcing high-payoff programs will set conditions for revision, revitalization, or development of the right programs at the right time to support current and future leader development.

Adjust LD&E content, delivery, and timing. The task force's ultimate goal is to change the Army educational system's content, delivery, and timing to be compatible with, relevant to, and supportive of

current and future operational requirements. Feedback from field commanders, students, lessons learned, and past studies revealed that the operational environment changes so quickly the value of classroom and unit experience can have a short shelf life. Soldiers must know what to do and how to do it.

We are not attempting to prescribe how to do things but to describe what "right" looks like and to build experience before it is needed. Army professionals must be able to access relevant knowledge on demand to set conditions for success in their current assignments as well as to expand their base of general knowledge to support building experience. The task force analyzed the educational system to see if it supported an Army at war while preparing leaders for the future. Some of the lessons learned from current operations and the need to embed appropriate joint education throughout the institutional education process suggested deficiencies. One such deficiency was revealed when the task force examined how the institutional domain supports leaders in cultural awareness and language skills. A comprehensive program was not available for all who needed it, unless they could attend the Defense Language Institute or Graduate School. The following paragraphs address these deficiencies.

Ensure relevant content. The task force recommended continuing to embed Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) observers in deploying units and encouraged unit feeds into the lessons-learned system as set forth in Army Regulation 11-33, *Army Lessons Learned Program: Systems Development and Application*.¹³ CALL provides valuable information to guide training, education, and combat preparation and drives curriculum updates in most institutions. As we continue to integrate changes that arrive from field experience, we must also develop appropriate joint training and education based on a needs analysis, whose use affirms a standards-based process that considers the entire system.

We must assign experienced leaders to combat training centers and to doctrine and training development positions. The implications of harnessing relevant and current experience to enable faster assimilation of lessons learned are enormous. Who better to articulate tactics, techniques, and procedures than those who have experienced them?

There is a caution, however. The Army's institutions of higher learning must acknowledge the shortcomings of knowledge based solely on experience and address these gaps. Every person comes with a perspective that differs in scope depending on the



COL James L. Mowery of CALL confers with LTC Charles Bush and other artillerymen at Task Force Hawk's forward operating base in Albania, June 1999.

leader's position, experience, and responsibilities. Each perspective is only one view of a situation. The institutional domain must bridge the perspectives gap.

We must create fellowships for selected leaders in agencies that will enable in-depth analysis of Army doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). These experiences will create heightened understanding of the relationship between the institutional, organizational, and self-development domains, exposing redundancy, promoting integration, synchronizing resource allocation, and focusing efforts on relevant requirements. Our professional education systems will benefit. Schools and centers will have access to subject matter experts who know how to integrate and manage DOTMLPF throughout the Army, which, in turn, will enhance the relevance of existing and projected education and training content. By giving credit for military education by means of a fellowship program, the Army can educate a larger cross section of soldiers without incurring additional schoolhouse costs.

We must execute quality assurance for all Army training and education programs. The task force did not advocate creating another inspection agency, but it did recommend executing the one we have better. Quality assurance accreditation provides a feed-

back mechanism that links support systems to execution systems to identify gaps in resourcing content development, delivery, and maintenance.

Transitioning from a predominately branch-centric to a functionally-based LD program to enable development of combined arms and joint fitness is a controversial proposal. Branch-centric leader development has served the Army well. As we evolve toward joint, expeditionary, stabilized, modular forces, the branch-centric approach limits educational outcomes by narrowing content. Branch-focused content, while satisfactory for sustaining Army core competencies, is not robust enough to address complex future operational environments.

Changing to function-based leader development brings assets and requirements together in an efficient program designed to embrace the environment and context of a modular, stabilized, IIIM-type force. One possible functional grouping might include the functions of maneuver; fires; support and logistics network; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Each branch could align with appropriate functional areas and uncover synergy and efficiencies.

Function-based developmental programs within the institutional domain expand flexibility to the force in terms of reachback, timing, and delivery while

maintaining proficiency in land combat capability. The Army Logistics Management Center is organized along the lines of logistical branches integrating functionally. By combining the common aspects of logistical functionality, Fort Lee, Fort Eustis, and Aberdeen Proving Grounds have eliminated redundancy while maintaining core competencies in content. While improving content solves one aspect of the recommendation, timing and delivery means are of equal importance.

Execute appropriate delivery and revise timing. We must develop and execute mobilization programs of instruction (POI) where necessary. During war, requirements for forces outpace the peacetime capability to meet demand. Mobilization POIs are normally abbreviated versions of existing instructional programs and help force providers with an alternative timeline to meet demand. Current mobilization POIs require updating. Educational systems that undergo revision will need an accompanying mobilization POI developed as well. Also, in wartime, the Army must de-couple training and education from promotion to stop penalizing the soldier. Without this de-coupling, a soldier could be disadvantaged from promotion depending on the length of operations. Second- and third-order effects of this might manifest themselves as quality-of-life and retention issues.

One means of adjusting delivery is to continue outsourcing selected technical training where appropriate. Highly technical skill-sets lend themselves to outsourcing to civilian industry. The industries that supply equipment and technologies that require advance training can also provide that training. Using corporate capital when training and educational needs can be met is cost-effective. What is not recommended is outsourcing core-capability training. A ready example for transfer to industry is maintenance training. Industry has to provide its own training to sustain its capability. Transferring capital costs to industry and avoiding maintenance expenses and infrastructure investment will benefit the Army. Outsourcing transfers resource burdens to industry and causes development of alternative delivery methods and timing to maximize distance learning to support the force, not the educational experience. Doing these things can be cost-effective in terms of time and the opportunity to participate.

Our current methods of delivery lack flexibility to meet the changing needs of an Army at war. Moving away from bricks and mortar, institutional methods, and sequential timing of content is one aspect of revision. Using sophisticated assessment vehicles to measure mastery of content without having to attend resident training is a more relevant method. We

should provide students attending a resident course the option of demonstrating mastery before each block of instruction and, when they demonstrate it, provide additional learning opportunities through distance learning.

Exploit learning technologies. Leader development is deliberate, continuous, sequential, and progressive in all three domains, and there is no intended end state. Also, leader development evolves based on new learning and must optimize the latest learning technologies and best practices to account for any future environmental challenge or opportunity. The Army can no longer afford time-consuming methods that do not respond to rapid changes in the environment. The demand to have a large proportion of the force continually deployed does not permit prolonged absences from operations.

The requirement to be smarter about developing methodologies to educate the force has never been more pronounced. Learning technologies are combat multipliers. They must include how people learn and how to facilitate that learning. Leaders must learn how to use information technology to automate old decisionmaking processes and to facilitate creative thinking and enhance innovation. Building systems that provide greater access to tailored individual and team learning is now a requirement.

Advance technological delivery means and well-devised collection plans by assessment teams will create the conditions for success. Rethinking the most efficient methods of optimizing educational opportunities through technology insertions will provide the essential support an expeditionary Army requires. The task force considered technology as an enabler in three ways: human-dimension requirements that guide enhanced learning; virtual and constructive technological methods; and technologies that create greater access to knowledge.

We must coordinate with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and other institutions to investigate future leadership and LD requirements, learning-technology advances, and future learning methods. We must incorporate applicable cognitive and educational psychology research and development into the LD&E research plan and allocate resources to support research and development of performance-enhancement technologies.

The Army must incorporate simulations into LD&E, where appropriate; develop and tailor simulations for institutional and self-development use; and pull the CTC experience into the classroom. We must also evolve Army Knowledge Online and the Battle Command Knowledge System to link individuals with communities of practice and lessons learned;

MG Buford Blount, 3d Infantry Division Commanding Officer, explains the current situation in Baghdad to Ambassador Barbara Bodine and her staff, Iraq, 22 April 2003.



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delineate responsibilities and resource requirements among the installations, units, and individuals that provide the linkages to learning systems within our living environments; and ensure that design specifications for infrastructure projects include knowledge and learning enablers that facilitate access.

Establish a single integrating proponent. We must establish a single integrating proponent for Army military and civilian leadership and leader development to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of leadership policies and programs. Strategic leaders require a personnel management system that combines operational readiness with developmental experiences. A single integrating proponent is best-suited to developing and incorporating the strategy for the life cycle of a leader within the greater context of the COE and to help integrate Army leader development within the Department of Defense and the Government. The single proponent at the DA level seems to fit with the DA G3. Integration would include, but not be limited to, moving the responsibility for LD and leadership policy under the selected DA proponent.

We must also—

- Synchronize Army Regulation 600-100, *Army Leadership*; DA Pamphlet (Pam) 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army*; DA Pam 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Development and Ca-*

reer Management; and FM 6-22, *Army Leadership*.¹⁴

- Appoint the commanding general of TRADOC as the Army's executive agent for all Army leader development.

- Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Army leadership and LD policies by revising publications and updating procedure.

- Implement Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) III or a like personnel management system across the force to enable a single officer-education program.

Establish LD&E for civilian leaders. Any examination of leader development within the profession of arms would be incomplete without an equally detailed look at the civilian workforce. The Army must establish an LDs system for civilian leaders that mirrors that of the military force.

A single, inclusive, integrated Army LD&E program, based on function and organization and designed to create shared and combined developmental experiences to develop teams, is essential for effective cross-component strategic systems to support the Army at war. This integration must—

- Move proponentcy of civilian leader development from the G1 to the G3 and appoint the commanding general of TRADOC as the Army's executive agent for all civilian education, and the

commanding general must mandate proponentcy and resourcing for the civilian workforce as well.

- Identify Army civilian competencies to support readiness and integrate them into competency-based training and education courses and schools.

- Establish a training, transit, hospital, separation-type account for Army civilians.

- Develop and implement integrated individual, organizational, and institutional accountability mechanisms to link professional and personal education with development. The Army must integrate Army civilians into the Army's 360-degree assessment-and-feedback program and align career programs with branch or military career fields, as appropriate.

The decentralized management of the civilian workforce needs overhauling. The developmental aspects of civilian personnel management are disjointed and sacrifice potential while rewarding mediocrity. Identifying requirements for training and development are haphazard at best and nonexistent at worst.

Tools exist or are in development that allow personnel managers to forecast to the user-identification-code-level turnover rates and skill imbalances resulting from projected losses. These tools would be useful in designing and implementing a civilian education system and forecasting specific course requirements. Given that the average age of Army civilians is approximately 48, we know the Army will be heavily involved in hiring and developing the future force for the next decade.¹⁵ Forecasting tools must be able to quantify the need.

Civilian policy changes must include developmental

maps similar to those in DA Pam 600-3.¹⁶ The civilian workforce was integrated into the proponent system in the late 1980s and early 1990s with varying degrees of success. Some career fields, such as transportation, actively integrated civilians into their planning, training, and development. Many others are exclusively populated with civilians (for example, civilian personnel offices) and should be included in any actions or initiatives career managers structure into the proponent system.

Incorporating this civilian senior army workforce concept is imperative. The concept is based on central management of supervisors and leaders at grades GS-12 through GS-15 and is patterned after the OPMS that includes managed assignments, mandatory mobility, and mandatory completion of sequential, progressive training in order to be promoted.

The Army must integrate civilian training and education into the Active Component LD system, where feasible, and integrate civilian and contractor managers and leaders into mid- and senior-level military education staff courses with a focus on strategic planning and pre-deployment preparation. Training support systems require updating, but no method to track training offered or completed exists for the civilian workforce. A tool is available, but because training delivery is decentralized at this time, commanders can choose whether or not to use it. Integrating civilian training into a mandatory system is needed. The content, delivery, and timing of training are not synchronized with workforce requirements. A train-select-promote system would solve this problem. **MR**

NOTES

1. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Training the Force* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2002).

2. GEN Creighton Abrams, Jr., quoted in GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, "Arrival Message," August 2003, on-line at <www.army.mil/leaders/csa/messages/1aug03.htm>, accessed 1 February 2005.

3. Ibid.

4. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) threats branch response to the Leader Development and Education (LD&E) Task Force's (TF's) request for information concerning current operating environment changes, December 2003.

5. TRADOC is resourced at 78 percent of its manpower requirements for Fiscal Year (FY) 2004, and 78 percent of its manpower requirements for FY 2005. TRADOC is resourced at 75 percent of its validated requirements for funding for FY 2004. TRADOC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Training, and Resources, briefing to LD&E TF, October 2003.

6. LD&E TF White Paper, December 2003.

7. LD&E TF Update Briefing, November 2003.

8. FM 22-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: GPO, August 1999).

9. U.S. Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (Pam) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer*

Development and Career Management (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 October 1998).

10. Input from LD&E advisory counsel. Additional recommendations for 360-degree assessment-and-feedback systems were derived from the LD&E TF officer team background search, October 2003.

11. Ibid.

12. Schoomaker, "The U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List," on-line at <www.army.mil/cmh/reference/CSAList/CSAList.htm>, accessed 11 February 2005.

13. U.S. Army Regulation (AR) 11-33, *Army Lessons Learned Program: Systems Development and Application* (Washington, DC: GPO, 10 October 1989).

14. AR 600-100, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: GPO, 17 September 1993); DA Pam 350-58, *Leader Development for America's Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, 13 October 1994); DA Pam 600-3; FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 1999).

15. Office of Personnel Management, "Federal Employment Statistics," on-line at <www.opm.gov/feddata/>, accessed 2 February 2005. Statistics show a steady decline in numbers as well as percentage of the workforce 40 and younger. In 1998, 29 percent of the workforce was 40 or younger. In 2000, 27 percent, and in 2002, 26 percent.

16. DA Pam 600-3.

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